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New Thinking in the Fight 
Against Marine Piracy:  
Financing and Plunder 
Pre-Empting Piracy Before 
Prevention Becomes Necessary 
Hugh R. Williamson* 
Contemporary piracy has been a serious regional problem 
since the 1980s. In addition to the seizure for ransom of vessels 
off the Horn of Africa, attacks against the refugee “boat people” 
in the Gulf of Thailand, hijacking of yachts in the 
Caribbean, the armed robbery of vessels in the Straits of 
Malacca, and the seizure of oil tankers in West Africa are all 
“piracy-like” criminal activities, even if they do not fit the 
classical legal definition of maritime piracy. Rather than focus 
on one specific outbreak, the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project 
has undertaken a global study of a business model of 
contemporary piracy and studied potential identifiers for 
potential outbreaks, as well as weak points that may be exploited 
to suppress piracy in the future. 
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I.  Introduction 
While much of the global concern surrounding marine piracy is a 
result of the outbreak in the Horn of Africa, the origins of 
contemporary piracy were evident several decades earlier. During the 
1980s there were attacks on Vietnamese boat people in the Gulf of 
Thailand marked by extreme violence and a series of armed robberies 
on ships transiting through the Straits of Malacca that were notable 
for the size of the targeted vessels.1 This drew some attention to what 
was formerly thought as a historical anachronism. While there have 
always been sporadic attacks on commercial shipping around the 
globe, it is the forms of contemporary piracy which have highlighted 
the inadequacies of the current system in dealing with serious crime 
at sea.  
The Dalhousie University Marine Piracy Project (DMPP) was 
launched in 2011 to examine modern piracy on a global basis. It was 
not restricted to any particular geographical area, class, or vessel. The 
objective was to identify vulnerable regions and to recommend 
suitable pre-emption or prevention strategies to lessen the problem 
and deal with the more serious consequences. The aim was not to 
duplicate work done by other organizations, but to identify where new 
or different strategies might provide a more effective solution.  
Antipiracy activities tend to fall under three main categories. The 
first includes actions to prevent pirate attacks, which involves actions 
by security forces and protection measures by ships. The second is the 
prosecution and punishment of pirates and their associates, which 
includes law enforcement and criminal justice activities. The third 
involves the strategies for the pre-emption of piracy, which is a far 
more difficult task since it attempts to keep “pirates” from becoming 
pirates in the first place. 
There may not be many new or innovative solutions to the 
prevention of pirate attacks, or the prosecution and punishment of 
pirates. Naval and security forces are well versed in the operational 
requirements, ships have been provided with both the guidance and 
training to avoid or hinder successful piracy attacks, and most 
criminal justice systems have the legal means, if not necessarily the 
political will, for effective law enforcement. However, it may be that 
providing better employment alternatives for potential pirates and 
decreasing profitability for piracy offers a more successful solution to 
avoid future outbreaks. 
 
1. See CAROLIN LISS, OCEANS OF CRIME: MARITIME PIRACY AND 
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND BANGLADESH 57–58 
(2011); see generally MARTIN N. MURPHY, SMALL BOATS, WEAK STATES, 
DIRTY MONEY: PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM IN THE MODERN 
WORLD (2009). 
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This article argues that antipiracy efforts should be channelled 
into pre-emptive strategies. First, piracy is essentially a profitable 
business, and efforts to combat piracy should focus on vulnerabilities 
in its business model, thereby preventing piracy’s evolution into a 
sophisticated, organized enterprise. Second, this article explains 
DMPP’s piracy indicators model, which evaluates current piracy 
trends in order to predict which other countries are susceptible to a 
piracy outbreak. Finally, it concludes that regional and international 
cooperation is required in order to develop an effective pre-emptive 
strategy to predict outbreaks of piracy and prevent its escalation.  
II.  Piracy: The Definitional Problem 
In the initial development of the study, one of the most difficult 
tasks was determining the limits of the subject matter. The problem 
with the definition of piracy is that it is both legally constraining and 
operationally vague. There have been numerous and very detailed 
analysis of the definition of piracy; however, for the purpose of the 
DMPP study, and this article, a working definition was chosen to 
allow the inclusion of piracy and piracy-like activities, while excluding 
those which were felt to be largely unrelated, or a distraction to the 
problem at hand.2 The project definition was as follows:  
Piracy is the actual or potential deliberate criminal interference 
with the rights and freedoms of the seas which target marine 
craft and persons for economic gain.3 
The hallmark of this piracy definition is that it includes illegal 
activities at sea carried out to obtain money, plunder booty, etc. by 
theft. This was seen as the motivation for piracy, but not necessarily 
the motivation for the individual pirates. The purpose of piracy is 
direct economic gain by the pirates, whether it involves the taking of 
valuables, ransom or extortion payment, or taking property for later 
use, such as seizing a yacht to be used for smuggling purposes. For 
this study, piracy does not include politically motivated actions, and 
would normally not include activities such as: political terrorism; 
illegal radio broadcasting (pirate radio); IUU fishing (pirate fishing); 
environmental activism (ecoterrorism); drug smuggling; slavery; 
mutiny; or hijacking. While these activities may be associated with 
 
2. See L. FANNING, M. SLOAN, S. WHITMAN, H. WILLIAMSON & S. DOUGLAS, 
EXPLORING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE SUPPRESSION AND 
PREVENTION OF MARINE PIRACY 6 (MARINE AFFAIRS PROGRAM 
TECHNICAL REPORT #4) (2012), available at http://www.dal.ca/ 
faculty/science/marine-affairs-program/research/research-news/map-
technical-series-reports.html. 
3. See id. 
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piracy, they are not its primary motivation, nor would they 
necessarily be the primary source of financial return. In short, piracy 
is a criminal activity for financial gain. 
III.  The Emergence of Contemporary Piracy: From 
Opportunistic to Organized Crime 
There have been at least six independent outbreaks of 
contemporary piracy, starting in the 1970s. These have all resulted in 
a serious threat to mariners and those working, voyaging, or in the 
case of refugees, escaping at sea.  
The first notable outbreaks were the attacks by local Thai 
fishermen on the ethnic Vietnamese boat people who were fleeing 
post-war Vietnam.4 While the refugees were not rich, what they had 
of value they carried with them in the form of gold or cash, making 
them attractive targets. They had no protection, and they were often 
crowded in large numbers on small vessels crossing the Gulf of 
Thailand. The Thai fishermen were able to rob, assault, and murder 
the refugees with relative impunity until international pressure forced 
the Thai government to take police action.5 By modern comparison, 
the payoff to the pirates was small, but during a time of economic 
collapse in the local fisheries, this represented a substantial source of 
money.  
During the same period, local criminal gangs, possibly including 
fishermen, were engaged in what can be described as “breaking and 
entering” on ships transiting through the Straits of Malacca.6 The 
pirates would board the ships from small boats, usually at night, 
armed with knives or possibly handguns. The pirates would force the 
captain to open his safe, which often contained a sizable amount of 
cash. They would also steal any valuables from the crew, and then 
leave the ship. In addition to the danger of violent assault on the 
crew, sometimes the ship would be left with no one at the helm while 
transiting one of the most congested waterways in the world. 
Contemporary piracy in the Caribbean was believed to be related 
to drug trafficking, with smugglers hijacking yachts or other small 
 
4. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 79, 86–87 
(2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.html. 
5. See id. at 87 (describing the anti-piracy program in Thailand, which 
included law enforcement efforts on land and sea). 
6. See LISS, supra note 1, at 58; see also J.N. Mak, Pirates, Renegades, 
and Fisherman: The Politics of “Sustainable” Piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca, in VIOLENCE AT SEA: PIRACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL 
TERRORISM 199, 200–01 (Peter Lehr ed., 2008) (describing how piracy 
has evolved in the Strait of Malacca). 
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vessels to use for the transport of drugs to the U.S.7 The exact 
numbers are not known; however, the suspicious disappearance of 
yachts and their crews with no other reasonable explanation resulted 
in an increase in patrols by the U.S. and regional Coast Guards.8 
While still considered a potential problem, changes in drug trafficking 
patterns have reduced the likelihood of these incidents. However, 
there continues to be a local problem with piracy against small fishing 
vessels on the Guyana coast, targeting fish catch and vessel 
equipment. This problem is sufficiently serious that the Government 
of Guyana has established a compensation fund to reimburse 
fishermen for stolen catch.9 
Piracy in the Indian Ocean falls into two major categories of 
activity. There is an ongoing and serious situation involving attacks 
on local fishing vessels off the Bangladesh coast.10 These incidents are 
largely unreported outside the local press unless they involve a 
substantial loss of life. This is considered a local issue, and the 
Bangladesh government is reluctant to label it as piracy in order to 
avoid increases in insurance rates.11 These attacks have involved the 
theft of catch and equipment, and some ransom demands from the 
families of the fishermen. Because they have not involved commercial 
shipping interests, the international shipping community has largely 
ignored such attacks. 
The better-known Somalia-based piracy off the Horn of Africa has 
attracted most of the world’s attention, as the major targets are 
international commercial vessels. The objective of the pirates was to 
 
7. See, e.g., Pirates of the Wild Coast, STABROEK NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/news/stories/09/30/pirates-of-the-
wild-coast/ (finding that maritime piracy in Guyana is a by-product of 
other related crimes, including drug trafficking). 
8. See id. (reporting on local Coast Guard efforts to counter piracy, 
including the establishment of communication systems with radios and 
GPS devices).  
9. See id. (describing the compensation fund and noting that it was one 
part of a comprehensive strategy to combat piracy).  
10. See, e.g., Syed Tashfin Chowdhury, Rising Piracy Threatens Coastal 
Bangladesh, KHABAR S. ASIA (May 4, 2013), http://khabarsouthasia. 
com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2013/05/04/feature-01 
(“Between January 2011 and November 2012, pirates attacked more 
than 1,000 fishing boats, abducted over 3,000 fishermen, killed 45 and 
collected more than Tk 100m ($1.28m) in ransoms from fishery owners 
in the two coastal towns Chakaria and Maheshkhali alone . . . .”). 
11. See Saleem Samad, U.N. Agency Says Bangladesh No Longer a “High 
Risk” Piracy Area, GANT DAILY (Jan. 2, 2012), http://gantdaily.com/ 
2012/01/02/u-n-agency-says-bangladesh-no-longer-a-high-risk-piracy-
area/ (reporting that Bangladesh requested it be removed from the 
“high risk” piracy areas list because the designation increased insurance 
costs). 
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hold ships and crews for ransom. This represented a major innovation 
in modern piracy, since the ransom amounts were quite large—to the 
order of several million dollars—where the pirates were generally 
unconcerned with disposing of either the ship or the cargo. As this 
represented a serious threat to international maritime commerce 
transiting through the Red Sea/Suez Canal and later into the Gulf, 
the resulting response by the international community included U.N. 
Security Council resolutions,12 deployment of international naval 
forces,13 and major changes to commercial shipping operations.14 The 
pirates also targeted local coastal ships, or dhows traffic, as well as 
fishing vessels and yachts. Though these were not the preferred 
targets, they were sometimes used as mother ships to increase the 
operating range of the “pirate action groups.”15 
The latest piracy trend to attract international attention has been 
on the Nigerian and West African coast.16 This initially started with 
attacks on local fishing vessels, commercial vessels in port or at 
anchor, and offshore oil installations. The pirates have increased their 
operating area to encompass most of the Gulf of Guinea and have also 
extended farther offshore. Many of the vessels taken have been 
tankers which are being robbed of their cargo of crude oil or 
petroleum products.17 This indicates a fairly sophisticated distribution 
 
12. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. 
Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 
(Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 2015, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
13. See, e.g., Operation Description, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV., 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-navfor-
somalia/mission-description/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) 
(describing the EU’s naval force (EU NAVFOR), which was launched in 
2008 as part of a comprehensive strategy to combat piracy in Somalia). 
14. See, e.g., BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION 
AGAINST SOMALI BASED PIRACY (2011), available at 
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_ 
5_2011.pdf (containing recommendations and best practices that the 
shipping industry should follow in order to prevent or delay piracy 
attacks, including increased speed and the employment of private 
maritime security contractors). 
15. See, e.g., Luis Martinez, Dutch Warship Destroys Pirate ‘Mother Ship’, 
ABC News (Oct. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/dutch-
warship-destroys-pirate-mother-ship/story?id=17554703. 
16. See Piracy Increasing in West Africa, Latest Report Shows, ICC 
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-
ccs.org/news/737-piracy-increasing-in-west-africa-latest-report-shows. 
17. See id. (reporting that Nigerian piracy is “increasing in incidence and 
extending in range”); Mark Doyle, Nigeria’s Piracy – Another Form of 
Oil Theft, BBC (June 18, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
22956865 (distinguishing the Somalia-based piracy model, which centers 
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system to facilitate the transfer and sale of large quantities of cargo, 
which would require the complicity of port officials and international 
business interests. 
A number of ship and cargo hijackings haven taken place in the 
South China Sea, with the collusion of corrupt officials in isolated 
ports who facilitate the disposal of the cargo and the renaming and 
subsequent sale of the ship.18 There is also a particular concentration 
on hijacking tug and tow boats,19 which may also be supplying a black 
market demand for tugs in the region. 
What is obvious is that while all the outbreaks may be classified 
as “piracy,” there are sufficient variations in perpetrators and targets 
to preclude a uniform response or solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on kidnapping and ransom, from the Nigerian model, where the main 
motivation is to steal crude oil or refined petroleum products from 
tankers). 
18. See Piracy in South East Asia, a Growing Threat, IDARAT MAR. (July 
17, 2009), http://www.idaratmaritime.com/wordpress/?tag=islamic-
terrorist-groups (“In the 1990s capture of ships and the murder of their 
crews, if they resisted, was not unknown in the South China Seas. In 
some cases ships were taken to a Chinese port, renamed, repainted and 
launched on a new career, all with the help of corrupt local officials.”). 
19. See Karsten von Hoesslin, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
the ASEAN Region: Incidents and Trends, in PIRACY AND 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES IN ASEAN: PROSPECTS FOR 
COOPERATION 126, 130 (Robert C. Beckman & J. Ashley Roach eds., 
2012) (noting that tugboat hijackings are unique to the South China Sea 
area and that many tugboats are resold on the black market). 
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Table 1: Contemporary Outbreaks of Marine Piracy20 
Location 
and Timing 
Victims Perpetrators Objective Response 
Caribbean 
Basin 
(1970s – 
ongoing)  
Yachts and 
fishing vessels
Drug smugglers, 
armed criminals 
Obtain a 
vessel to carry 
drugs to U.S., 
seize 
equipment and 
vessels 
U.S. Coast 
Guard patrols, 
Caribbean ship 
rider 
agreements 
Gulf of 
Thailand 
(1980s) 
Vietnamese 
boat people 
(refugees) 
Local  
Thai  
fishermen 
Theft of 
valuables 
carried by 
fleeing refugees
Regional 
anti-piracy 
patrol, Thai 
police 
land-based 
initiatives in 
fishing ports 
Straits of 
Malacca 
(1980s – 
ongoing)  
Transiting 
merchant 
ships 
Local criminal 
gangs 
Money in 
master’s safe 
and crew’s 
valuables 
Regional 
anti-piracy 
agreements 
South China 
Seas 
(1990s) 
Transiting 
merchant 
ships 
Possible rogue 
elements of 
military from 
the region 
Ship and cargo
Diplomatic 
pressure 
West 
African 
Coast 
(1990s – 
ongoing)  
Transiting oil 
tankers, fixed 
offshore 
installations,  
fishing vessels 
 
Local criminal 
gangs 
Theft and 
resale of oil 
cargoes and 
other tanker 
products, 
money, 
catches, use of 
fishing vessels 
as mother 
ships  
Regional 
anti-piracy 
strategy and 
agreements, 
regional 
operational 
coordination 
mechanisms  
East Africa/ 
Red Sea/ 
Indian 
Ocean 
(2000 – 
ongoing) 
Transiting 
merchant 
ships, yachts, 
fishing vessels
Local criminal 
gangs 
Ship and crew 
held for 
ransom 
Anti-piracy 
patrols, 
rerouting of 
vessels  
 
20. L. FANNING, H. WILLIAMSON & S. DOUGLAS, LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND 
GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR APPREHENDING AND PROSECUTING 
MARINE PIRATES (MARINE AFFAIRS PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT #2) 
28–47 (2012), available at http://www.dal.ca/faculty/science/marine-
affairs-program/research/research-news/map-technical-series-
reports.html. 
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IV.  The Piracy Cycle 
Unlike the “golden age of piracy” displayed in modern cinema 
with Jack Sparrow and the Pirates of the Caribbean, modern piracy 
has evolved independently, usually in specific regions, where local 
gangs began to target vessels in coastal waters. Attacks on large ships 
are seldom the first piracy incident in a region. Piracy follows a fairly 
predictable pattern or cycle, the early stages of which can usually be 
identified in hindsight after piracy has become more obvious and well 
entrenched. The cycle, as initially identified by Philip Gosse in his 
1932 book The History of Piracy,21 comprises three phases: a coastal 
subsistence phase, a professionally organized phase, and a “pirate as 
independent state” phase. Most contemporary piracy falls into one of 
the first two phases, as even in modern Somalia the pirates have not 
taken over the country.22 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the piracy cycle 
 
21. See PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 1–2 (Dover Publ’ns 2007) 
(1932). 
22. See Edward R. Lucas, Somalia’s “Pirate Cycle”: The Three Phases of 
Somali Piracy, 6 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 55, 63 (2013), available at 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss1/8/ (stating that Gosse’s 
piracy cycle is not fully applicable in the modern context because it is 
unlikely that current piracy organizations can achieve independent state 
status). 
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As shown in Figure 1, the cycle starts with precursor events, 
which are criminal or other activities associated with the maritime 
environment, but which may not necessarily target ships and cargoes 
directly. This may involve such things as smuggling, poaching of fish 
or traps, civil war, or lawlessness ashore. This opportunistic piracy, or 
armed robbery against ships, is usually committed by those already 
engaged in maritime activities, typically fishermen or smugglers from 
coastal communities, who capitalize on an opportunity encountered 
while undertaking their regular business. The example of Thai 
fishermen who chanced upon boatloads of Vietnamese refugees and 
robbed them while at sea is a classic case of “opportunistic piracy.” 
Significantly, the personnel, equipment, and costs support the primary 
activity, with the proceeds of piracy providing an added financial 
bonus. 
Piracy evolves from opportunistic to an organized business 
activity when the perpetrators abandon their traditional activity, be 
it fishing, smuggling, or in some cases, law enforcement, and begin to 
specifically target vessels for criminal gain. This marks a shift to 
organized piracy, where the gain from the enterprise’s “plunder” must 
cover the operating costs and show a profit as well. This increases the 
associated risks, driving pirates to seek greater reward. At this point, 
the participants may still largely be composed of the original 
opportunistic pirates who now pursue a more lucrative line of work. 
As with other organized crime activities, a successful and 
profitable enterprise will attract new entrants. The requirements of a 
larger and more sophisticated logistics support network will also 
increase piracy’s visibility and influence through wealth distribution 
in the community, corruption of local officials, and the recruitment of 
new and younger members. Piracy has evolved into a sophisticated 
culture and business system. 
There may be an additional phase to the cycle, where due to 
outside pressure, successful enforcement activities, lack of targets, or a 
decrease in profitability, the pirates opt out of piracy and choose 
other activities. Pirate attacks against the Vietnamese boat people 
eventually ceased due a halt in the exit of refugees and successful 
actions taken by the Thai police.23 There are recent reports that some 
of the Somali pirate gangs have switched roles, and are now providing 
security for foreign fishing vessels in the region. This is an interesting 
transformation, since one of the claimed precursors to piratical 
activities in the Horn of Africa was the enforcement action by the 
Puntland coast guard and other irregular militias against illegal 
foreign fishing during the 1990s.24 
 
23. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 4, at 87. 
24. See Chair of the Security Council Comm. Pursuant to Resolutions 751 
(1992) and 1907 (2009), Letter dated July 12, 2013 from the Chair of 
the Security Council Comm. Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 
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One of the practical issues consistently raised concerning global 
efforts to combat marine piracy is the comparative cost of trying to 
eliminate piracy entirely, or to reduce it to an “acceptable” level. The 
DMPP Intersectoral Working Group (ISWG), comprised of 
international experts on piracy, suggested an agreed end-state for 
organized piracy whereby “[t]he crime of marine piracy is reduced to 
an internationally agreed or acceptable level—by creating and 
sustaining a level of maritime security that allows vessels and their 
crews to feel confident and safe without the need for an armed 
escort.”25 Such an end-state model acknowledges that the elimination 
of all opportunistic piracy is unrealistic. The ISWG felt that efforts 
might focus on preventing the evolution to the organized business 
stage.  
As part of the piracy cycle, it was postulated that there are points 
of particular vulnerability, when the piracy organization is evolving to 
a higher level, where specific actions can hinder the operational 
effectiveness and reduce the profitability of a piracy enterprise. By 
specifically targeting these vulnerabilities, most notably when 
opportunistic piracy begins to evolve into an organized activity, it 
may be possible to suppress the emergence of a major piracy outbreak 
before it becomes entrenched. 
V.  The Piracy Business Model: When Opportunistic 
Becomes Organized 
As part of the development of a business model of piracy, the 
DMPP working groups considered the support structures necessary to 
facilitate a large and fairly sophisticated criminal enterprise. The 
development of this stylized business model for piracy highlighted 
several components where the piracy enterprise may be particularly 
vulnerable. Organized piracy, as it increases in complexity, requires a 
sophisticated logistics system to sustain its operation. This includes: 
obtaining a vessel, food, fuel, and water; recruiting a trained crew; 
procuring weapons; maintaining a sufficient support base; gaining the 
cooperation of local officials through corruption and bribery; 
identifying purchasers and selling plundered cargo; transferring and 
paying money; and acquiring intelligence on potential targets. 
  
 
1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013). 
25. DALHOUSIE UNIV. MARINE PIRACY PROJECT, INTERSECTIONAL WORKING 
GROUP WORKSHOP SUMMARY REPORT, 25–27 July 2012, at 8 (2012). 
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Figure 2: Stylized Business Model 
Most of the individual sectors associated with the business model, 
such as food and water suppliers or the cargo sellers, represent 
legitimate activities within the greater community in which the 
pirates are based. Transactions with these providers, such as the 
purchase of fuel or the sale of a cargo commodity, would not 
necessarily be a violation of any law unless it could be proven that 
there was knowledge of the intended criminal use. Since these 
activities also form part of the regular pattern of legitimate activities, 
such as local fishing, it becomes difficult to control access by pirates 
without hindering the legitimate users.  
The tracking of piracy finances has also proven somewhat 
problematic. In opportunistic piracy, the amount of actual cash or 
valuables is usually quite small, and it would not generally attract 
much attention. When piracy becomes better organized and begins to 
attract larger payouts, the movement of larger payout, from either the 
illegal sale of plundered cargo, or in the Somalia piracy situation, the 
laundering of large cash ransom payments, may be easier to identify. 
One of the necessary support structures for organized piracy is access 
to banking or other financial transfer systems.  
The presence of an informal value transfer system (IVTS) has 
been instrumental in allowing Somali pirates to distribute ransom 
payments without passing through formal banking channels, where 
such funds might be identified by financial reporting requirements.26 
 
26. See Shima D. Keene, Maritime Piracy, Somalia, INST. FOR STATECRAFT 
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.statecraft.org.uk/research/maritime-piracy-
somalia (“The movement of money within Somalia and out of Somalia is 
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The hawala system, which is present throughout the Middle East, is 
the major form of finance movement for many of the local and 
immigrant communities. The system allows monies to be transferred 
both within the community and internationally. While it has been 
identified as a major potential conduit for piracy money and other 
criminal funds, this represents only a small (6 percent) amount of 
total financial transactions.27 As a result of the danger in carrying 
cash or other valuables, and the corruption present in the official 
financial systems of weak states, including those experiencing piracy, 
the development of cellular telephone-based payment systems has 
become widespread for everyday financial transactions. This allows 
pirates and other organized criminal activities to gain access as well, 
and it provides for another currently unregulated IVTS. This method 
is widely used in Somalia to purchase supplies and make payments in 
the local communities. While the identification and tracking of 
finances should be pursued, due to the existence of such informal 
systems, it may not be the primary means of reducing the 
profitability of contemporary piracy. 
The need for pirates to obtain sophisticated modern weapons and 
the cooperation of local officials through bribery or corruption may 
also prove an effective means of weakening the piracy business 
structure. Much of the opportunistic piracy and armed robbery of 
vessels is still carried out using edged weapons, such as knives and 
machetes, to intimidate smaller crews. Attacks on larger vessels and 
their capture for ransom have generally involved the use of military 
grade weapons, including assault rifles and RPGs.28 Such weapons are 
difficult to obtain in most countries, and controlling their movement, 
and restricting their availability, is another area where antipiracy 
forces should cooperate with other law enforcement and security 
bodies. 
One of the attributes of contemporary organized piracy is that it 
succeeds in a weak state rather than a strong state or a totally failed 
state. A strong state has sufficient governance and enforcement 
capabilities to suppress piracy. In failed states, there is insufficient 
infrastructure to support organized piracy and insufficient security to 
 
via either cash couriers or the informal value transfer system known as 
hawala, due [to] the lack of an established banking system within 
Somalia.”). 
27. See J. MACPHEE, BEATING THE BANKS: HAWALA’S PLACE IN THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND ITS POTENTIAL LINKS TO PIRACY (MARINE 
AFFAIRS TECHNICAL REPORT #8) 1 (2012), available at http://www.dal. 
ca/content/dam/dalhousie/images/faculty/science/marine-affairs-
program/Technical_series/MAP%20Technical%20Report%20%238.pdf. 
28. See Frank Gardner, Dangerous Waters: Running the Gauntlet of Somali 
Pirates, BBC (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
17354830. 
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protect their ill-gotten gains from other criminals. Paradoxically, in a 
weak state, there is access to functioning logistical support, but 
insufficient government control to keep the pirates from using it.29 For 
organized piracy to thrive, it requires a secure base of operation; weak 
or permissive local enforcement; access ports and facilities for 
unloading cargoes; and access to markets for the sale of plunder. This 
requires the acquiescence or participation of local officials and 
members of the business community. The strengthening of weak state 
governance, specifically to assist in developing and implementing 
anticorruption measures,30 combined with better coordination and 
implementation of international anticorruption agreements, can 
deprive contemporary pirates of safe and accommodating havens for 
their activities. 
One area that the ISWG working group identified as a major 
potential tool against organized piracy is the reduction of individuals 
recruited into organized piracy.31 In particular, focusing on the 
recruitment and employment of children and juveniles in criminal 
activities, especially maritime piracy, could provide a major 
deterrence to piracy operations through a reduction in profitability. It 
is estimated that up to one third of modern pirate gangs are made up 
of juveniles and children.32 This represents not only a major source of 
potential pirate recruits, but also the cheapest source of available 
 
29. The Influence of State Weakness and State Failure on Marine Piracy, 5 
MARINE AFF. POL’Y F. (Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project, Halifax, N.S.), 
Apr. 2013, at 3–4 (analyzing how the degree of a state’s failure may be a 
driver in piracy operations). 
30. Organized crime requires the systematic use of corruption and corrupt 
officials—a point which is underappreciated. See COMBATING 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: CONCEPTS, ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSES 63–64 
(Phil Williams & Dimitri Vlassis eds., 2001) (“[C]riminal organizations 
usually function effectively . . . through systematic activities designed to 
evade government efforts to control or halt their illicit activities. In 
some cases, they take major initiatives to corrupt governments, trying 
to achieve a form of systemic or ‘institutionalized corruption’ that, in 
effect, allows them to operate on or through national territory with 
impunity.”). 
31. See S. WHITMAN, H. WILLIAMSON, M. SLOAN & L. FANNING, DALHOUSIE 
MARINE PIRACY PROJECT: CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN MARINE PIRACY – 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND THE WAY FORWARD (MARINE AFFAIRS 
PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT #5) 5–6 (2012), available at 
http://www.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/images/faculty/science/mari
ne-affairs-program/Technical_series/MAP%20Technical%20Report%20 
%235.pdf (noting how children are a valuable asset to piracy groups 
because, among other things, they are easily manipulated and are cheap 
to employ). 
32. See Mark A. Drumbl, Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and 
Accountability 11 (Washington & Lee Pub. Legal Studs., Working Paper 
No. 2013-16, 2013). 
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labor. While piracy as an offence may not be serious enough to 
warrant prosecution at the International Criminal Court level, the 
systematic employment of children as part of the business model may 
be seen as a sufficiently serious “crime against humanity” to warrant 
the prosecution of those who organize, finance, and direct maritime 
piracy from the safety of shore. As with child pornography and child 
prostitution, holding those who employ children as marine pirates to a 
higher and more dangerous level of criminal accountability could go a 
long way to discourage their involvement in marine piracy, which may 
cause a decrease in overall profitability. 
VI.  The Piracy Indicators Model 
As part of the DMPP project, the Socio-economic Module 
undertook the development of a predictive indicators model to 
determine whether it was possible to identify early symptoms or 
precursors to a more substantial outbreak of maritime piracy.33 The 
objective was also to identify those countries or regions which might 
be at risk of experiencing a potential outbreak. 
Using a database of reported piracy events and other available 
geographical and socioeconomic data, the study used a number of 
variables to determine if there was any correlation between them and 
incidents of piracy. One initial difficulty was the lack of 
comprehensive reported data on the different classes of vessels 
involved in piracy attacks. While the information is fairly detailed for 
incidents involving large commercial vessels, which are reported to the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB)’s piracy reporting center, there 
was less data available for attacks on smaller vessels such as dhows or 
fishing vessels, and even fewer for attacks on yachts.34 
The study eventually selected ninety-nine countries, each of them 
with coastlines and available data for the selected variables. This 
included the fourteen countries, which have experienced reported 
piracy outbreaks (classified as more than twenty piracy events) from 
2000 to 2011. The selected variables were: the length of coastline; the 
human development index score; the gross national income per capita; 
 
33. See generally M.R. BROOKS, R. PELOT, J.W. REUCHLIN & S. REZAEE, 
NON-OPERATIONAL PREDICTIVE INDICATORS OF PIRACY: IDENTIFYING 
POTENTIAL OUTBREAKS (MARINE AFFAIRS PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT 
#10) 12 (2013), available at http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/ 
Publications (describing the process and details of the piracy indicators 
model). 
34. See id. at 10–11 (describing the informational gaps in IMB’s statistics 
due to, among other things, under-reporting and non-trade vessels’ lack 
of familiarity with IMB reporting procedures). 
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the corruption perception index score; the failed state index score; and 
the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of overfishing.35 
The initial results of the analysis did not provide any strong 
indicators. In part, this is attributed to a lack of more comprehensive 
data for all the selected states. There were, however, some interesting 
results when the selection of countries was subsequently narrowed to 
exclude those countries that have not had a single piracy event during 
the study period. With this modification, a single variable showed a 
significant degree of correlation. As part of the failed state index, 
there was a component for “human flight and brain drain” (HFBD).36 
While the nature of the correlation is not clear, there may be a link to 
countries experiencing an exodus of refugees with the resulting 
instability. It is also possible that the loss of human capital results in 
a decrease in the partnership and the development of local 
alternatives to piracy. This may lead young people seeking relative 
economic or social security to seek employment in the criminal sector. 
VII. Identifying Possible Outbreaks 
 
Figure 3: Map of piracy outbreak countries and countries 
with increased risk of outbreaks 
The study identified fourteen countries which have experienced 
piracy outbreaks, but also identified a further thirteen countries which 
 
35. Id. at 18. 
36. Id. at 29 (explaining that “countries that suffer from ‘brain drain’ and 
also an ‘economic drain’ of people leaving in search of better economic 
perspectives or out of fear of persecution or repression have a higher 
chance of piracy”). 
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are vulnerable to an outbreak of piracy.37 The countries highlighted in 
dark in Figure 3 have already experienced a piracy outbreak in the 
2000–2011 period. These are Somalia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, 
Philippines, India, Peru, Vietnam, Brazil, Guinea, Venezuela, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ecuador, and Ghana. 
The countries shown in grey in Figure 3 have experienced low 
levels of piracy in the same period, but their levels of HFBD suggest 
that they maintain a chance of piracy outbreaks in excess of 25 
percent.38 These countries are Guatemala, Mexico, Liberia, Guinea-
Bissau, Papua New Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and 
the Dominican Republic. 
There are several points of significance that can be gleaned from 
these results. For one, the presence of Brazil is somewhat puzzling as 
it has had significant piracy attacks, but the model does not indicate 
it to be at serious risk. Brazil is a strong state with extensive 
governance and strong military resources. One fact that may explain 
why Brazil has experienced piracy outbreaks is its proximity to 
Guyana. Guyana was not included due to a lack of reported incidents 
at the time of the study, but it has experienced an increase in 
fisheries-related piracy problems, some of which may extend along the 
coast. What is more interesting is that since the study was completed, 
there have been additional reported attacks in Papua New Guinea, 
Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all from the list 
of potential outbreaks.39 
 
 
 
 
37. Id. at 25, 31. 
38. Id. at 31. 
39. See SURITEC, PIRACY REPORT: PIRACY AND ACTS OF ARMED ROBBERY 
AT SHIPS, NOVEMBER 2013, at 17, 22 (2013) (noting the violent piracy 
attacks that have occurred recently in Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo); see also SURITEC, PIRACY 
REPORT: PIRACY AND ACTS OF ARMED ROBBERY AT SHIPS, FEBRUARY 
2014, at 6, 8 (2014). 
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There is clearly a need for further development of the model, 
including the greater acquisition of relevant data and a better 
understanding of the significance of some of the indicators. The 
ability to provide a more accurate warning of potential trouble areas 
could be a valuable tool for the pre-emption of piracy. 
VIII. Establishing a Pre-emptive Strategy 
What is apparent from the study of the present situation is that 
there is no shortage of analysis, instruments, or agreements on ways 
to fight piracy. What is also very clear is that there is a sufficient 
difference in the way piracy has evolved around the world to preclude 
any single strategy, or any single legal mechanism, from providing a 
uniform solution. As with other areas of law enforcement, combating 
piracy does not necessarily require new piracy-specific laws; increasing 
the effective use of previously established mechanisms is more 
important. 
It is suggested, however, that in addition to more effectively using 
the tools and resources available, the fight against piracy requires 
better coordination and information sharing among the parties 
involved. This would include better cooperation between different 
agencies, both nationally and internationally, and an integration of 
enforcement efforts. There are insufficient resources to provide for an 
individual solution each time the problem arises. This means that the 
various countries and bodies with responsibility for specific areas and 
issues must cooperate in efforts to share information, responsibility, 
and the work involved. It is important to acknowledge that piracy is 
an international problem, but it is not the only international problem.  
To this end, in addition to the security and operational activities 
involved in the prevention of piracy attacks, there must be a 
concerted effort to eliminate the development of organized piracy by 
severely restricting pirates’ abilities to profitably operate their 
businesses.  
Doing so can be effected using existing international legal 
instruments and organizations to accomplish the following four goals. 
First, financial movements, both in the payment for illegal activities 
and the laundering of piracy profits must be restricted. Second, ships 
and smaller vessels which have been taken by pirates for sale or 
disposal must be identified and tracked. The International Maritime 
Organization registration currently covers larger vessels, but it does 
not include fishing vessels and other smaller classes of ships. Third, 
access to military grade weapons must be limited. Fourth, countries 
must assist each other in identifying and prosecuting bribery and 
other corrupt practices, so as to limit the corruption of public 
officials. 
Piracy does not exist in isolation, but is often combined with 
other problems in the maritime area. States and organizations must 
be encouraged to develop an integrated approach to maritime 
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security. It is significant that the new West African Code of Conduct 
Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, 
and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa,40 while using 
the Djibouti Code of Conduct as a model, requires member states to 
cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the “repression of 
transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime 
terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea.”41 
The code further defines “transnational organized crime in the 
maritime domain” to include: money laundering; illegal arms and drug 
trafficking; piracy and armed robbery at sea; illegal oil bunkering; 
crude oil theft; human trafficking; human smuggling; maritime 
pollution; IUU fishing; illegal dumping of toxic waste; maritime 
terrorism and hostage taking; and the vandalising of offshore oil 
installations.42 
This shows the great concern in West Africa with more 
comprehensive issues of marine security. This is a change from the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct, which deals only with the issue of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea. This obviously reflects Nigeria’s great 
concern with the theft of oil, but also the general regional concern for 
a wide range of marine security problems, which need to be addressed 
as well, such as human smuggling, illegal fishing and environmental 
issues. This may reflect the perception that piracy in Somalia was 
preceded by extensive illegal fishing and waste dumping activities, 
and that these were instrumental precursor events in its emergence. It 
may also reflect a greater willingness of the regional states to take a 
more reasonable view of sovereignty, and to assist the weaker and less 
capable states in the protection of their offshore areas. This may be 
the necessary step in preventing pirates from using adjoining 
territorial sea boundaries to avoid pursuing naval forces. By including 
a greater range of marine security issues, the West African Code of 
Conduct may provide a more effective model for pre-empting 
organized piracy, by establishing a means for cooperation during the 
early stages of an outbreak. 
 
40. See IMO Strategy for Implementing Sustainable Maritime Security 
Measures in West and Central Africa, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/WestAfrica.
aspx. 
41. Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] et al., Code of 
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against 
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, 
art. 2(1) (June 25, 2013), available at http://www.ecowas.int/ 
publications/en/maritime_security/code_of_conduct.pdf. 
42. Id. art. 1(5). 
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IX.  Conclusion 
Whatever else it may be, marine piracy is a business, and it will 
persist as long as there is money to be made. Identifying and 
exploiting potential vulnerabilities in the business model can reduce 
the profitability of piracy and help restrict it to an opportunistic 
activity. Once established on an organized basis, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to prevent attacks on ships and the associated 
social disruptions on land. 
The early identification of potential piracy outbreaks can allow for 
the implementation of a pre-emption strategy to deal with emerging 
incidents and precursor events, and also to prevent the development 
of full-scale organized piracy. The huge costs associated with piracy in 
Somalia may well have been avoided had there been earlier 
interventions. This is not just to protect shipping in the region, but 
more importantly, to deal with precursor events, such as the 
exploitation of the vulnerable coastal regions of weak or failing states 
by foreign fishing and other interests. This is a situation where “an 
ounce of prevention could have avoided many millions of £’s, $’s and 
€‘s of cure.” 
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